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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-THE
RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC
DRUGS MASKED BY PRISON BARS
Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Washington v. Harper,' the United States Supreme Court re-
versed a Washington State Supreme Court decision 2 that required a
judicial hearing before a prison inmate could be given antipsychotic
drugs against his will.3 The Harper Court determined that while a
prison inmate retained a liberty interest in avoiding forced adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs, 4 such treatment also served legiti-
mate state interests. The Court further determined that the
Washington State regulation governing involuntary treatment was
related reasonably to the penological concerns asserted,5 and pro-
vided adequate procedural protections under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 6
Confinement does not obliterate all constitutional rights; there-
fore, the finding that a prison inmate retains a liberty interest in
avoiding antipsychotic drug treatment is consistent with past judicial
policy. This Note argues that defining the liberty interest as "signif-
icant" rather than "fundamental" influenced the Court's ultimate
decision in this case. The right to decide whether or not to take
medication that chemically alters the mind and has potentially seri-
ous side effects is a fundamental liberty interest.
No liberty interest, though, is absolute; thus, in certain circum-
stances, a state's interests may outweigh an individual's liberty inter-
est. This Note concludes that if the state's security and
administrative concerns were inseverable from the state's obligation
to provide medical treatment to a prison inmate, then the Washing-
ton regulation was related reasonably to legitimate penological con-
1 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
2 Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988).
3 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1044.
4 Id. at 1036.
5 Id. at 1039.
6 Id. at 1044.
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cerns. Had the Harper Court viewed each asserted state interest
separately, however, its conclusions arguably would have been dif-
ferent. First, viewed in isolation, neither asserted interest would
have been legitimate; and second, the regulation would not have
been reasonably related to either interest. This Note thus concludes
that had the Court defined the interest as fundamental rather than
significant, it readily could have concluded that the regulation was
an exaggerated response to penological concerns.
Washington's challenged regulation called for a hearing com-
mittee to review a doctor's prescription of drug treatment when the
inmate refused such treatment. This Note concludes that, although
a judicial hearing may not cure the problem of bias among the hear-
ing committee members because of deference given to professional
judgment, it at least affords the individual more protection for his
fundamental right than a potentially biased hearing committee
would.
Finally, this Note argues that in the appropriate circumstances,
requiring formal commitment proceedings, with their attendant




Walter Harper was sentenced to the Washington State Peniten-
tiary in Walla Walla for robbery." From 1976 to 1980, the state
housed him in the mental health unit there.9 During that time, he
voluntarily underwent antipsychotic drug therapy. 10 The state pa-
roled Harper in 1980, contingent upon participation in psychiatric
treatment. 1 The state revoked his parole after he assaulted two
7 The facts are undisputed. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 874, 759 P.2d 358,
360 (1988). For a full recording of the facts, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the State of Washington, Appendix B, Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599)
[hereinafter Findings of Facts].
8 Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 874, 759 P.2d at 360.
9 Hdrper, 110 S. Ct. at 1032. Harper did not plead insanity as a defense. Findings of
Facts, supra note 7, at B-4.
10 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1032. Harper received a variety of antipsychotic drugs, in-
cluding Trialafon, Haldol, Prolixin, Taractan, Loxitane, Mellaril, and Navane. Anti-
psychotic drugs, sometimes called "neuroleptics" or "psychotropic drugs," are
medications often used for mental disorders such as schizophrenia. These medications
affect the chemical balance in the brain and are administered to assist the patient in
organizing his or her thoughts and in regaining a rational state of mind. These drugs
have potential serious side effects. Id. For a discussion of the benefits versus the risks of
antipsychotic drug treatment, see infra notes 100-117 and accompanying text.
11 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1032.
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nurses at Saint Cabrini Hospital in Seattle.12 Upon return to prison,
Harper went to the Special Offenders Center (SOC)'3 at Monroe in
January, 1982.14 Until November 1982, Harper voluntarily submit-
ted to treatment including administration of antipsychotic drugs. 15
Upon his refusal to continue the drugs, Dr. Petrich, his attending
physician, recommended that the medication be continued against
Harper's will.16
Dr. Petrich presented his recommendation to a hearing com-
mittee, which authorized the administration of the drugs. 17 Harper
appealed the decision to the Monroe Reformatory Superintendent,
who upheld the decision.' 8 For approximately one year, Harper
continued to be medicated involuntarily. 19 In November, 1983, the
state transferred Harper to the Washington State Reformatory,
where he did not take any medication. 20 His condition deteriorated;
one month later, the state transferred him back to the SOC. After
another hearing, the involuntary drug treatment was reinstated. 21
The SOC medicated Harper until June 1986, when the state trans-
ferred him to the Washington State Penitentiary. 22
Special Offenders Center Policy 600.30 provided the proce-
dures for medicating Harper against his will. 23 The Findings of
12 Id. at 1033.
IS The SOC is a 144-bed correctional institution administered by Washington State's
Department of Corrections. The state established the SOC to provide diagnosis and
treatment of convicted felons having serious behavioral or mental disorders. The SOC's
purpose is to help inmates attain a level of functioning so that they can be transferred to









22 Id. The state returned Harper to the SOC in April, 1987. In accordance with SOC
Policy 600.30, Harper was medicaed involuntarily from September 1987 until May 1988,
when the Washington Supreme Court rendered its opinion. Id. at 1035 n.6.
23 An earlier Supreme Court decision influenced the formulation of SOC Policy
600.30. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Vitek, the Court found that Nebraska
infringed the liberty interests of a prison inmate when the inmate was transferred invol-
untarily from the state prison to a state mental hospital for treatment of a mental dis-
ease. Id. at 487-94. The Court found that the transfer to a mental hospital was
stigmatic, involved exposure to behavior modification techniques, and was a major
change in the conditions of confinement. Id. at 492. The Court enunciated clear stan-
dards for determining if the transfer should occur. Such transfers must be accompanied
by adequate notice, opportunity for hearing before an independent decision-maker, a
written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
decision, and provision by the state of a licensed attorney or lay advisor. Id. at 494-95.
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Facts describe these procedures:
a. [A] prisoner may be involuntarily medicated only where he suf-
fers from a mental disorder and as a result of which is either gravely
disabled or presents a likelihood of serious harm to himself or others
24
b. Medications must be ordered by, or in emergencies, approved
by a psychiatrist. Where the patient/prisoner refuses medication, a
special hearing committee is convened, consisting of a psychiatrist,
psychologist, and the Associate Superintendent of SOC. None of the
committee members may be currently involved in treatment or diag-
nosis of the patient ....
c. The prisoner has certain procedural rights prior to the hearing,
including i. twenty-four hours notice, during which time he may not be
medicated; ii. notice of the tentative diagnosis, factual basis for the
diagnosis, and the basis on which medical treatment is necessary.
d. At the hearing the prisoner has the right to be present and
present evidence; the institution is required to present its evidence;
the inmate may present his own witnesses and cross examine the staff
witnesses. The prisoner is also entitled to a lay advisor who has an
understanding of the psychiatric issues in the case.
e. [T]he prisoner has the right to appeal to the SOC
Superintendent.
f. After-the initial hearing, involuntary medication can continue
only with periodic reviews. 25
The Court further explained that when Harper was initially
Justice White delivered the opinion for the Court, except on the issue of provision of a
licensed attorney. Justice Powell delivered the opinion on this issue, concluding that a
prison inmate is not constitutionally entitled to such counsel in a hearing for transfer to
a mental hospital. Id. at 497-500.
24 "Mental disorder" means "any organic, mental or emotional impairment which
has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions."
WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.020(2) (Supp. 1990).
"Gravely disabled" means
a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder: (a) [i]s in danger of
serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his essential human
needs of health or safety, or (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine function-
ing evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over
his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health
or safety.
Id. § 71.05.020(1).
"Likelihood of serious harm" means
either (a) [a] substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual
upon his own person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to commit suicide or
inflict physical harm on one's self, (b) a substantial risk that physical harm will be
inflicted by an individual upon another, as evidenced by behavior which has caused
such harm or which places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sus-
taining such harm, or (c) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an
individual upon the property of others, as evidenced by behavior which has caused
substantial loss or damage to the property of others.
Id. § 71.05.020(3).
25 Findings of Fact, supra note 7, at B-3-4.
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medicated the policy required the hearing committee to review its
decision to medicate after seven days. If reapproved, medication
could continue for fourteen days. At the end of the two week pe-
riod, the policy required the treating psychiatrist to review the case
and submit a report to the Department of Corrections Medical Di-
rector in Olympia for review. These fourteen day reviews continued
as long as the patient was involuntarily medicated. The state
amended SOC Policy 600.30 to allow a fourteen day initial treat-
ment rather than a seven day period. If treatment continued for one
hundred and eighty days, the state required the SOC to conduct a
new hearing to consider the need for further treatment.26 Finally,
an inmate may obtain judicial review of the hearing committee's de-
cision through either a personal restraint petition or a petition for
an extraordinary writ.27
Harper did not dispute that the state followed the SOC proce-
dures. 28 Nevertheless, in February, 1985, he filed suit in state court
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming that the policy's failure to
provide a judicial hearing before the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs violated the due process, equal protection, and
free speech clauses of both the United States and Washington State
Constitutions, as well as Washington tort law. 2
9
B. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION
In March, 1987, the trial court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice.3 0 The court concluded the following: first, Harper did
have a liberty interest protected by the due process clause in not
being given antipsychotic medications; second, the decisions made
by the Special Hearing Committee were in accordance with SOC
Policy 600.30; and third, the SOC policy is consistent with the due
process requirements of the Constitution.3 1
C. WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT OPINION
In a direct appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, reversed. Justice Brachtenbach authored the unanimous de-
26 Id.
27 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1034.
28 Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 876, 759 P.2d 358, 361 (1988).
29 Joint Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Washington v. Harper, 110
S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599). The Washington Supreme Court based its decision on
due process grounds. The petition for certiorari only raised due process concerns; thus,
the Court ignored equal protection and free speech claims and confined its analysis to
due process issues. 110 S. Ct. at 1035 n.5.
30 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1034.
31 Findings of Facts, supra note 7, at B-8-9.
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cision, holding that a prisoner is entitled to a judicial hearing before
antipsychotic drugs can be administered against his will.32
Justice Brachtenbach agreed with the trial court that Harper
had a protected liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drug treat-
ment, but concluded that this interest required the highest level of
protection.33 The'court had previously ruled that refusal of elec-
troconvulsive therapy (ECT) was a fundamental liberty interest re-
quiring a high level of protection. 4 The court found administering
antipsychotic drugs, given their serious side-effects, no less intrusive
than ECT.3 5
Justice Brachtenbach did not agree, however, that the proce-
dures of the SOC Policy 600.30 adequately protected this funda-
mental liberty interest. The court distinguished Vitek v. Jones,36
which "concerned... the 'stigmatizing consequences' of a transfer
to a mental health hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment
consisting of a behavior modification program. 37 Because the in-
voluntary ingestion of antipsychotic drugs raised the prospect of se-
rious, potentially permanent side-effects, the court determined
Harper's liberty interest required greater protection than that in
Vitek.38
The court held that involuntary antipsychotic drug treatment
could be ordered by a court if, in a judicial hearing, the State
"9proves (1) a compelling state interest to administer antipsychotic
drugs, and (2) the administration of the drugs is both necessary and
effective for furthering that interest." 39 The court remanded the
case to the lower court to make specific findings with regard to the
state's interest in the treatment, the necessity and effectiveness of
the treatment, and the desires of the patient.40
32 Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d at 881, 759 P.2d at 363.
33 Id. at 876, 759 P.2d at 361-62.
34 In re Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d. 500, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986).
35 Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 878, 759 P.2d at 362.
36 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
37 Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 880, 759 P.2d at 363 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
494 (1980)).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 883, 759 P.2d at 364. The court refused to apply a reasonable relation analy-
sis to the medication policy as urged by the state, finding that the uniquely intrusive
nature of antipsychotic drug treatment was distinguishable from the first amendment
interests involved in the cases cited by the state, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)
and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 883, 759
P.2d at 364 n.9.
40 Id at 884, 759 P.2d at 365. The lower court could also enter a substitute judg-
ment on behalf of the prisoner in accordance with Schuoler. Id. (citing In re Schuoler, 106
Wash. 2d 500, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986)).
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III. OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether ajudi-
cial hearing was required before a state could treat a mentally ill
prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his will. Resolution of the
issue required a discussion of the protections afforded a prisoner
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 1
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court; he was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Scalia. The Court first addressed Harper's conten-
tion that the case was moot because the state had ceased administer-
ing antipsychotic drugs to him against his will.42 The Court
unanimously decided that the case was ripe for adjudication. 43 Be-
yond the mootness issue, Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion,
in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court first determined that Harper did have a liberty inter-
est in "avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs." 44 The Court reasoned that SOC Policy 600.30 allowed
Harper to have an expectation that the drugs would not be arbitrar-
ily administered. 45 According to Justice Kennedy, the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment confirmed that expectation. 46
The inmate's right to refuse medication, however, is limited by the
fact of his or her confinement. 47 Justice Kennedy explained that the
limitation comes from considering the inmate's medical interests,
given the legitimate needs of the institution. 48 The Court con-
cluded that Harper retained a liberty interest in refusing the drugs,
but that interest was not greater than that set forth in the state-cre-
ated policy.49
The Court applied the standard of review for prison regulations
41 Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1032 (1990).
42 Id. at 1035.
43 Id. At the time of the decision, no evidence demonstrated that Harper had recov-
ered from his mental illness. He was still serving his sentence. He previously had been
transferred back to the SOC. As the Court pointed out, in April, 1987, two years after
he filed his claim, the state transferred Harper back to the Center and involuntarily med-
icatedshim pursuant to Policy 600.30 from September 1987 to May 1988. The SOC
suspended medication only because of the Washington Supreme Court's decision. The
possibility existed that Harper would be medicated again, against his will. Id.
44 Id. at 1036.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1037.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1040.
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enunciated in Turner v. Safley 50 and OLone v. Estate of Shabazz.5 1 This
standard states that a prison regulation that is claimed to infringe on
an inmate's constitutional rights is valid if it is "reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests. ' 52 Applying the three relevant
factors taken from Turner to determine the reasonable relation to
the challenged prison regulation, the Court concluded that SOC
Policy 600.30 comported with constitutional requirements.53 The
government interests asserted to justify the regulation included the
obligations to provide medical treatment and to insure the safety of
the prison population, including staff and administrative person-
nel. 54 According to the Court, there could be no doubt that these
were legitimate objectives. 55 Treating mentally ill inmates who
posed a danger to themselves and/or others was a "rational means"
of furthering the state's legitimate objectives. 56 The Court found no
apparent alternatives to satisfying the state's interests. 57
Turning to the procedural protections necessary to protect
Harper's liberty interest in refusing the drug treatment, the Court
held that SOC Policy 600.30 comported with procedural due pro-
cess demands.5 8
Taking into consideration the inmate's private interests, the
government's interests, and the value of the procedural require-
ments, the Court first tackled the primary issue of whether or not a
judicial hearing was required. 59 Recognizing that the due process
clause never has required that the trier of fact be trained legally,60
50 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulation concerning marriage held constitutionally
invalid and another concerning inmate correspondence held constitutionally valid).
51 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (prison regulation concerning participation in religious ser-
vice held constitutionally valid).
52 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
53 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1038. The three relevant factors are as follows: (1) "'a
"valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and legitimate governmental
interest put forward to justify it,'" id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89); (2) the impact
that accommodating the individual's constitutional right will have on the prison popula-
tion and the allocation of resources, id (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90); and (3) the ab-
sence of ready alternatives without having to shoot down all conceivable possibilities, id
(citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91). Id.
54 Id. at 1037, 1039.
55 Id. at 1038.
56 Id. at 1039.
57 Id. The Court rejected Harper's proffered alternative, that as a precondition to
antipsychotic drug treatment, the State must find him incompetent and then obtain
court approval of the treatment using a "substituted judgment" standard. The Court
also found physical restraints or seclusion unsatisfactory.
58 Id. at 1040.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1042 (citing Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979)). In Parham, a severely
retarded man was found to have constitutional rights to safe conditions and freedom
1991] 959
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
the Court concluded that medical personnel were better equipped
to assess the necessity of medication, especially for the mentally
ill.61 The Court reasoned that the prisoner's interests were pro-
tected, because the medical personnel must have determined the
following: first, the inmate suffered from a mental disorder; and
second, as a result of that disorder, he was dangerous to himself or
others.62 Because the decision was mainly a medical one, the Court
held that a state may conclude that a judicial hearing would not be
effective.63
The Court further determined that SOC Policy 600.30 provided
adequate procedural safeguards for the protection of the inmates
interests. 64 Policy 600.30, without evidence to the contrary, pro-
vided for notice, the right of the prisoner to be present at the hear-
ing, and the right to present and cross-examine witnesses.6 5 The
Court also was satisfied that the involvement of an independent lay
advisor who understood the psychiatric issues would also provide
sufficient protection. 66
The Court, in conclusion, found that the challenged regulation
met the demands of the due process clause, because
[i]t is an accommodation between an inmate's liberty interests in
avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the
state's interests in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce
the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder
represents to himself or others.67
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens took issue with both the majority's definition of
the liberty interest and what procedures were necessary to protect
that liberty interest.
According to Justice Stevens, Harper's right to refuse anti-
from bodily restraint; whether his rights had been adequately protected was a decision
left to professionals and considered presumptively valid.
61 Id. at 1042-43. In addition to Parham, the Court relied on Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307 (1982), to substantiate this conclusion. In Romeo, the Court held that chil-
dren had a constitutional right to be free from confinement; therefore, in a parent's
commitment application for the child, great deference was given to the professional in
determining the child's medical needs. Id.
62 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042-43.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1043.
65 Id. at 1044. The Court also saw no reason why the rules of evidence should be





psychotic drugs was fundamental. 68 The interest had two essential
dimensions. The physical dimension stemmed from the desire to
avoid the highly intrusive invasion of the drugs into the body, which
could cause serious, potentially permanent, side effects. The intel-
lectual dimension stemmed from our nation's most basic value, the
right to be free in' thoughts, emotions, sensations, and beliefs.69
Justice Stevens equated forced drugging with altering the will and
the mind of the individual.70 In defining the liberty interest, Justice
Stevens, unlike Justice Kennedy, greatly emphasized Harper's ada-
mant refusal of the drug treatment and the side effects he already
was experiencing. 7'
Justice Stevens agreed that a state interest72 might be advanced
to justify the deprivation of this liberty interest.7 The majority said
that providing the drugs in the medical interests of the inmate was a
legitimate state interest. According to the dissent, however, the
SOC policy failed on the majority's terms, because it did not require
a finding that the drugs would benefit the inmate's medical condi-
tion.74 The only justifications Justice Stevens found for the forced
administration of the drugs were institutional and administrative
concerns, especially prison security.75
Although the state certainly had a legitimate interest in prison
security, according to Justice Stevens, the Court misapplied the
standard of review announced in Turner.76 The dissent contended
that the SOC policy was not related reasonably to the interest in
security and management. Rather it was an exaggerated response
to a legitimate purpose.77
68 Id. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 1045 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1046 nn. 5 & 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 The three possible state interests that could have been asserted included: (1) drug
treatment as punishment for the crime he committed; (2) as a "cure" for his mental
illness; or (3) as a mechanism to maintain order in the prison. According to the dissent,
the Court recognized Harper's liberty interest only as against the first. Id. at 1047 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
73 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 1049 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 1051 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 1049 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 1050 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent illustrated this by reference to
another SOC policy for involuntary medication in emergency situations when the inmate
poses a serious harm to himself and others. The policy is to medicate involuntarily the
individual. According to Justice Stevens, the state makes no distinction between the
emergency and non-emergency situations; thus, addressing security risks by forced use
of antipsychotic drugs in a non-emergency situation was an "exaggerated response" to
that concern. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens' main objection to Justice Kennedy's analysis
was its failure to consider separately the asserted justifications for
forced medication-the inmate's medical interests and the security
concerns. 78 According to Justice Stevens, the majority opinion re-
sulted in a "muddled rationale" combining state and individual
medical interests which, in the end, only protected institutional con-
cerns at the expense of the inmate's "substantive" liberty interest.79
In the dissent's eyes, the Court fared no better in considering
what procedures were necessary to protect the liberty interest.8 0
Justice Stevens objected that the members of the hearing committee
were not disinterested parties for several reasons.8 ' First, the panel
members had to review the work of treating physicians-their col-
leagues-and, on subsequent occasions, those very panel members'
work might be before another hearing committee. Such a system
forced colleagues to sit in judgment of one another.8 2 Second, the
policy only proscribed the attending physician from participating in
the initial seven day medication approval.8 3 Third, the composition
of the committee ensured that its decisions were biased toward insti-
tutional concerns.8 4 Finally, all the other procedural "safeguards"
seemed to be geared toward institutional concerns.85 In sum, the
dissent objected to the institutional concerns that plagued the deci-
sion to administer antipsychotic drugs, with seemingly little regard
for the inmate's medical interest, thus depriving an inmate of a fun-
damental liberty interest.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
The Supreme Court recognized that the question of whether a
prisoner is entitled to a judicial hearing before antipsychotic drugs
78 Id. at 1051 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 1052 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 1053 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). In fact, Dr. Petrich,
Harper's attending physician, participated in the committee that approved long-term
medication after the initial seven day period. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Only one member of the three person committee is
trained and licensed to prescribe antipsychotic drugs, and one member has no medical
expertise at all. In addition, appeals are made to the SOC superintendent. Id. at 1053-
54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1055 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The committee need not consider less intru-
sive measures or the severity of the medication being prescribed. The hearing is only
for the seven day initial period and the inmate has no opportunity to object to the deci-
sion to medicate on a long-term basis. Id. at 1054-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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can be administered against his or her will had substantive as well as
procedural aspects.
A substantive due process issue first involves defining the con-
stitutionally protected interest and then deciding under what cir-
cumstances the state's interest might outweigh it.86 In Harper, the
issue specifically was "what factual circumstances must exist before
the state may administer antipsychotic drugs to the prisoner against
his will?" s
1. The Individual's Liberty Interest
Defining the liberty interest is crucial to the ultimate decisions
of when the constitutionally protected interest may be overridden
and what procedures will safeguard the liberty interest. The Court
was unanimous in deciding that Harper had a liberty interest in
avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs. The
members of the Court could not agree on whether or not the inter-
est was a fundamental one. The Court, though, lacked an objective
method for determining what constitutes a liberty interest.
'While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the lib-
erty ... guaranteed [by the fourteenth amendment] the term has re-
ceived much consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to en-
gage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and gener-
ally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.'... In a Constitution for a
free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must
be broad indeed.88
The definition of liberty interests apparently is left to the dis-
cretion of the Court. The majority in Harper defined the liberty in-
terest at issue as significant, but recognized that the right was no
greater than that defined by the state.8 9 However, the dissent de-
fined it as a "fundamental liberty interest deserving the highest or-
der of protection." 90 Without an objective means for deciding
between these two definitions, neither approach can be wrong.
86 Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982).
87 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1036.
88 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
89 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
90 Id. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Given the importance of the individual's decision about medical
care, though, the latter definition makes more sense.
The Washington legislature created a liberty interest to which
Harper was entitled; namely, the reasonable expectation that un-
wanted antipsychotic drugs would not be administered indiscrimi-
nately. Even though the state liberty interest may not exist under
the federal constitution, the Supreme Court nonetheless recognizes
state created liberty interests and requires procedural protections
for said interests. 9'
In Harper, the state created liberty interest also existed under
the due process clause.92 If a state policy creates a liberty interest
but provides less protection than the federal constitution would
provide, then the policy will be declared unconstitutional. Thus,
how the Court defines the liberty interest protected by the constitu-
tion is crucial. Harper's constitutional right to refuse drugs re-
quired greater protection than Policy 600.30 afforded, because it
was a fundamental liberty interest requiring the highest order of
protection, and prison bars did not affect the fundamental nature of
the interest.
It is well established that, although deprived of freedom, a pris-
oner retains his or her constitutional rights, 93 including the right to
due process of law. 94 However, the majority could not find that
Harper retained a fundamental liberty interest, because it did not
isolate the liberty interest from the needs of the institution.95 Jus-
tice Kennedy failed to support why a prisoner's right under the due
process clause "must be defined in the context of the inmate's con-
finement." 96 On the other hand, the dissent argued that the major-
ity ignored the "physical" and "intellectual" dimensions of the
liberty interest, because it not only failed to consider the serious and
potentially permanent injury, even early death the drugs can cause,
but it also overrode "a competent person's choice to reject a specific
form of medical treatment. '97
91 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
92 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990) (com-
petent individual has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment).
93 See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
94 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
95 Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1990).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1045 (Stevens,J., dissenting). A competent person is entitled to reject medi-
cal treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 U.S. 2841, 2851
(1990); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,
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Conflicting assessments of the scientific data concerning the
risks and benefits of antipsychotic drug treatment influenced Justice
Kennedy's and Justice Stevens' definitions of the liberty interest,
and therefore, how each ultimately decided the issue. Prescribing
antipsychotic drugs to an inmate against his will presented a novel
issue for the Court, but weighing the risks and benefits of antip-
sychotic drugs did not.98 The courts' assessments of risks and bene-
fits have not been consistent. 99 This comes as no surprise
considering the disagreement among medical experts. The Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association (APCA) and the American Psychological
Association (APLA) filed amicus curiae briefs in Washington v.
Harper, the former on behalf of the State of Washington, and the
294 n.4 (1982); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973). The notion that mind altering
is a deprivation of liberty, in the most literal and fundamental sense, is derived from the
right to be let alone set out in Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). If
Harper was not a prison inmate, no doubt can exist that he would have a right to refuse
the administration of any medication, including antipsychotic medication. Overcoming
such a right would require a compelling state interest.
98 See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1317 (1990). In Charters, the federal government had committed a prison inmate
involuntarily to a psychiatric hospital. The trial court declared the inmate was incompe-
tent to stand trial because of the danger he posed to himself and others. Without ac-
cepting a particular assessment of drug treatment, the Fourth Circuit held that the
inmate did retain a liberty interest, but the decision to medicate against the patient's will
was at base a medical one and did not require judicial approval. See also Bee v. Greaves,
744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985). A pretrial detainee,
while in jail, challenged the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs. The plaintiff
had been found competent to stand trial. The court recognized that the pretrial de-
tainee retains a liberty interest in refusing unwanted drugs. Because of the potentially
serious side-effects, the Tenth Circuit held that the state's security interest could only
overcome the inmate's interest if less restrictive alternatives were considered. It further
held that extended medication may represent an exaggerated response to the legitimate
state purpose of security. See also Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated
and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983). In Klein, the
Third Circuit concluded that mentally ill patients committed involuntarily to state insti-
tutions retain a constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. Only after the patient
is found to endanger himself or others can professionals make the decision to involunta-
rily medicate. The decision is presumed valid unless it is shown to be a substantial de-
parture from accepted professionaljudgment. Finally, see Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982), overruled on other grounds, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984), on remand, 738 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1984). This complex litigation concerned
the rights of involuntarily committed mentally ill patients. In Rogers, the First Circuit
avoided the constitutional question, vacated the lower court's decision, and remanded
the case for a determination of the rights and duties of the parties entirely under state
law. See also infra notes 136 and 163 for discussion of Rogers.
99 Cf. Goedecke v. State, 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979) (en banc) (court con-
centrated on the negative side effects in a right to refuse case); State v. Hayes, 118 N.H.
458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978); State v.Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 553 P.2d 1296 (Ct. App. 1976);
State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978) (courts recognized competency re-
storing qualities of antipsychotic drugs when criminal defendants were to appear in
court).
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latter on behalf of Harper. The diametrically opposed views of
these two associations illustrate the depth of professional
disagreement.
It is undisputed that antipsychotic drugs are important to the
treatment of mental disorders.1 00 It is also undisputed that antip-
sychotic drug treatment can result in potentially serious and, in
some cases, permanent side-effects.' 0 The dispute arises in weigh-
ing the benefits and risks.10 2 Without commenting on the relative
success of drug treatment or the relative gravity of side-effects, the
following attempts to sketch the two sides of the issue.
Antipsychotic drugs have been used widely to treat psychoses,
particularly schizophrenia. ' 0 3 The chemical effect is to clear halluci-
nations and delusions produced by the psychoses. This, in turn,
provides stability, facilitates therapy, and reduces hospitalization.10
Some experts have gone as far as to suggest that the drugs "rein-
force the most important aspects of mental functioning" and have a
normalizing effect.' 0 5 However, it is also undisputed that serious
side effects exist.
The side-effects of antipsychotic drugs include dystonia, a se-
vere involuntary spasm of the upper throat, tongue or eyes; akathe-
100 Buried in the APLA's severe criticism of antipsychotic drugs is a concession that
"[t]he use of [antipsychotic] drugs may be appropriate to treat schizophrenia, paranoia,
childhood psychosis, and certain neuropsychiatric disorders such as Tourette syndrome
and Huntington's chorea." It further recognized that "[flor some patients, these drugs
may be helpful-even essential-in restoring mental function." Brief of the American
Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10, 15, Wash-
ington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599) [hereinafter APLA Brief].
101 The APCA's glowing review of antipsychotic drug treatment readily admits
"psychotropic medication may cause unwanted side effects" and does not wish to "di-
minish the gravity of [particular] uncomfortable and potentially serious side effect[s] of
antipsychotic medication." Brief of the American Psychiatric Association and the Wash-
ington State Psychiatric Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14, 16,
Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599) [hereinafter APCA Brief].
102 Accounting for the biases of the two professional associations is beyond the scope
of this article. However, it is not unreasonable to assume a certain inclination on the
part of psychiatrists to view mental disorders as organic, thereby favoring the use of
drugs, and for psychologists to concentrate on the social and mental aspects of the dis-
ease, thereby disdaining the use of drugs in favor of an alternative method of treatment.
This debate is not likely to be settled in the near future.
103 APCA Brief, supra note 101, at 11 (citing Kane, Treatment of Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZ-
OPHRENIA BULL. 133 (1987).
104 Id. at 12 (citing Appelbaum & Gutheil, Rotting with Their Rights On, 7 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306, 308 (1979); Spohn, Phenothiazine Effects on Psychological and
Psychophysiological Dysfunction in Chronic Schizophrenics, 34 ARCHIWES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 633
(1977)).
105 Gutheil & Appelbaum, "Mind Control, " "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence, "and
Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects ofAntipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77,
119 (1983).
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sia, the inability to remain still, restlessness and agitation; and
pseudo-Parkinsonism manifested by a mask-like face, drooling, mus-
cle rigidity, stiffness, tremors and a shuffling gait. Nausea, skin
rashes, dry mouth, congestion, diminished energy, suppression of
personality, vomiting, diarrhea, blurred vision, nocturnal confusion,
tremors and spasms have also been attributed to the use of antip-
sychotic drugs.'0l Liver damage, changes in heart rate (including
cardiac arrest), convulsions, neuroleptic malignant syndrome (which
often leads to death), 0 7 and tardive dyskinesia are considered the
most severe side effects.' 08
Harper was first diagnosed as suffering from manic-depressive
disorder; subsequently, he was thought to have schizo-affective dis-
order. The diagnosis at the time of the trial was schizophrenia. 10 9
He received voluntarily and involuntarily Trialafon, Haldol,
Prolixin, Taractan, Loxitane, Mellaril, and Navane. 10 As a result,
Harper exhibited symptoms of acute dystonic reaction and akathe-
sia. 1 ' He did not exhibit symptoms of tardive dyskinesia. 12
The state and its amici argued that Harper's drug treatment was
positive and rehabilitating. Harper, because of his mental illness,
had a tendency toward assaultive behavior which was reduced with
drug treatment."5 Recall that Harper was unmedicated when he
was paroled. The state revoked his parole after he assaulted two
nurses. 14 In contrast, Harper and his amici argued that his chance
of suffering from tardive dyskinesia was greater than one in four,
given the length of time he had been taking these drugs." 5 The
APLA charged that the APCA relied on reports rendered obsolete
106 APLA Brief at 6-9, supra note 100, and accompanying footnotes.
107 See Brief for the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599).
108 APLA Brief, supra note 100, at 7-8 (citing PHYsIcIAN's DESK REFERENCE (43d ed.
1989)). Most of the controversy centers on the severity of tardive dyskinesia, the likeli-
hood of its manifestation, its permanence, and treatment for it.
Tardive dyskinesia is characterized by bizarre, uncontrollable movements of the
face (lip smacking, chewing, protruding tongue, grimacing) and similar rhythmic,
involuntary movements of the trunk, arms and legs. At times it occurs in a mild
form, but its more serious form can include severe physical and other effects [in-
cluding severe respiratory complications, persistent vomiting; psychological distur-
bances such as anxiety, guilt, depression and even suicide].
Id.
109 Findings of Facts, supra note 7, at B-5.
110 Id. at B-7.
111 Id. at B-8.
112 Id.
113 APCA Brief, supra note 101, at 5.
114 Findings of Facts, supra note 7, at B-4.
115 Brief of Respondent at 18, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-
599).
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by more recent research that indicated the following: (1) the
prevalency of tardive dyskinesia had increased; (2) it was impossible
to predict which patients would develop the disorder; (3) the
chances of development increased the longer the patient stayed on
the medication; (4) and the disorder was reversible in only one-third
of the patients that suffered from it. 116 The APLA also charged that
there was a high rate of misdiagnosis of the disorder, mistaking
symptoms to be caused by the mental disorder itself, and that antip-
sychotic drugs were being administered indiscriminately.' 1 7
Harper demonstrates that the conflicting body of information
can lead to different definitions of the liberty interest. Dwelling on
the curative effects of the drugs, Justice Kennedy focused on how
the drugs benefitted Harper. It was unnecessary for Justice Ken-
nedy, therefore, to separate the needs of the prison from Harper's
interest; they were one and the same. Defining the interest as "sig-
nificant" was plausible. On the other hand, by considering why
Harper refused the drugs, Justice Stevens separated Harper's inter-
est from the concerns of the prison. The serious physical and
mental intrusion of these drugs strongly supported Justice Stevens'
conviction that the interest was fundamental, and prison bars should
not alter that fact.
Defining the interest, though, is just one step in the court's
judgment. A prison regulation that conflicts with a liberty interest
will be subjected to the same test,1 18 regardless of whether the inter-
est is defined as "fundamental," "substantial," or "significant."
2. Competing State Interests
The Court was not willing to find that Harper had an absolute
liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs. 119 Thus, regardless
of whether or not Harper's interest was fundamental, the Court had
to consider the competing state interest. Even the dissent recog-
nized that "[t]he State clearly has a legitimate interest in prison se-
curity and administrative convenience that encompasses responding
to potential risks to persons and property."' 120 The Court must bal-
ance the individual's interest against the state's interest.
116 APLA Brief, supra note 100, at 8.
117 Id. at 9-14.
118 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
119 The fourteenth amendment states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. While debate
over the meaning of these words has raged for over one hundred years, we would be
hard pressed to think of any interest, including a life interest, that is absolute.
120 Harper v. Washington, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1049 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Protection of inmates' rights is a relatively new phenomenon. 121
Movement away from the "hands-off"' 122 doctrine was inspired by
the courts' recognition of criminal defendants' constitutional rights
prior to conviction. 123 Once courts recognized criminal defendants'
rights, it seemed inconsistent not to recognize the rights of those
convicted and incarcerated. The expansion of 42 U.S.C. section
1983 claims to prison inmates provided the inmates with the means
to force the courts to address their rights. 124
Protection of prisoners' rights, though, largely is inconsistent
with the long-standing policy of deference to administrative officials
(police and prison authorities). The Supreme Court thus only con-
sidered the prisoner's rights within the context of his or her confine-
ment.125 The extent to which officials would be given deference,
though, remained unclear.
Clarification came in Turner v. Safley,1 26 where the Court enunci-
121 Historically, courts have neither been anxious to hear prisoners' complaints nor to
interfere with the administration of prisons. Note, The New Standard of Review of Prisoners'
Rights: A "Turner"for the Worse?, 33 Viii. L. REv. 393, 399 (1988) (citing Berger, With-
drawal of Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands-Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47
UMKC L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1978) and Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The
Future of Federal judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
211, 212-13 (1980)).-
122 The "hands-off" doctrine refers to the judicial refusal ofjurisdiction for prisoners'
claims. Courts have relied on three primary rationales to support their position of non-
intervention: 1) the possibility that intervention would violate the separation of powers
doctrine; 2) lack of judicial expertise regarding penology; and 3) the fear that interven-
tion by the courts would subvert prison discipline. Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prison-
ers' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 181 (1970) [hereinafter Goldfarb].
123 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings required
before one is questioned by a law enforcement official); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964) (evidence elicited when no warning of right to remain silent and suspect
denied counsel is inadmissible against defendant at trial); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (evidence illegally obtained by state officers is not admissible in a state trial);
Dowd v. United States ev rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) (habeas corpus proceeding ap-
propriate).
See also Goldfarb, supra note 122 at 183-85; see generally Note, Constitutional Rights of
Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
124 Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
125 Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) ("In seeking a
'mutual accommodation between the institutional needs and objectives [of prisons] and
the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application,'. . . this Court has
repeatedly recognized the need for major restrictions on a prisoner's rights.") (quoting
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
404-07 (1974) (addressing need to formulate a standard of review that responds both to
"the traditional policy ofjudicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and the need
to protect constitutional rights"); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) ("[A]
prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system.").
126 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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ated the standard of review for prison regulations. Specifically, a
prison regulation that burdens constitutional rights is valid if it is
related reasonably to legitimate penological objectives, 27 but inva-
lid if it represents an exaggerated response to those concerns. 128
The Turner Court delineated several factors relevant to making this
determination: (1) there "must be a 'valid, rational connection' be-
tween the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental inter-
est put forward to justify it;" (2) "whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to inmates;" (3) con-
sideration of "the impact- accommodation of the asserted constitu-
tional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources generally;" and (4) the absence of
ready alternatives. 129
Recognizing that SOC Policy 600.30 impinged upon a liberty
interest, the Harper Court considered whether or not the regulation
was related reasonably to legitimate penological concerns. The
Court identified the legitimate state interests as "combating the
danger posed by a person to both himself and others.., in a prison
environment" and the state's "obligation to provide prisoners with
medical treatment consistent not only with their own medical inter-
est, but also with the needs of the institution."'' 30 Justice Kennedy
concluded that the policy was a "rational means of furthering the
State's legitimate objectives."' 3' 1 The Court, further, found no ap-
parent alternatives. 3 2
Justice Stevens' objected to the majority's conclusions. He
wrote:
The flaw in Washington's Policy 600.30-and the basic error in the
Court's opinion today-is the failure to divorce from each other the
two justifications for forced medication and to consider the extent to
which the Policy is reasonably related to either interest. The State,
and arguably the Court, allows the SOC to blend the state interests in
responding to emergencies and in convenient prison administration
with the individual's interest in receiving beneficial medical
treatment. 133
127 Id. at 89.
128 Id. at 87.
129 Id. at 89-90. The Turner Court validated a prison regulation prohibiting corre-
spondence between inmates and invalidated a regulation that prohibited inmates from
marrying absent the showing to the superintendent of a compelling reason.
130 Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1038-39 (1990).
'3' Id. at 1039.
132 Id. The Court would not accept the requirement of first finding the inmate incom-
petent. "[Such] a rule takes no account of the legitimate governmental interest in treat-
ing him where medically appropriate for the purpose of reducing the danger he poses."
Id.
'33 Id. at 1051 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
970 [Vol. 81
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
Separating the interests may not have been as easy as Justice
Stevens assumed. Justice Kennedy stated, "Where an inmate's
mental disability is the root cause of the threat he poses to the in-
mate population, the state's interest in decreasing the danger to
others necessarily encompasses an interest in providing him with
medical treatment for his illness." 134 Justice Kennedy's justification
for why he collapsed the two state interests into one another is not
satisfying, however, because it emphasizes the problem that Stevens
suggested. SOC Policy 600.30 did not explicitly require a determi-
nation that forced medication would be in the inmate's medical in-
terest.135 The only evidence that the Policy called for a medical
determination was that the individual had to be suffering from a
mental disorder-a medical decision in itself.
The question of whether a medical decision was being made is
more complicated than either Justice suggested. Ostensibly, the
medical determination of mental illness was made prior to the
state's decision to medicate involuntarily (i.e., the state transferred
Harper to the SOC because he suffered from a mental disorder).
Harper was at the SOC to be rehabilitated to the point when he
could be returned to the regular correctional facility to serve the
rest of his sentence. The decision to use drugs may be a medical
one,'3 6 but the state made this decision primarily to serve an institu-
tional concern and not necessarily because it was the treatment of
preference for curing Harper's medical illness. This subtle distinc-
tion is extremely important in determining if the Court properly ap-
plied the standard of review for prison regulations. If the
"legitimate" interest in providing medical treatment is nonexistent,
134 Id. at 1039.
135 Id. at 1048-49. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Policy 600.30 requires: "In order for
involuntary medication to be approved, it must be demonstrated that the inmate suffers
from a mental disorder and as result of that disorder constitutes a likelihood of serious
harm to himself or others and/or is gravely disabled." The dissent refused to accept
that a medical determination was implicit in the policy, for the drug could not be admin-
istered unless the state found that the inmate suffered from a mental illness. Id.
136 In Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), the Court intimated that a decision to
administer forcibly drugs when the patient poses a threat to himself or others may be a
medical one given that, under the Constitution a doctor may make this decision in the
case of involuntarily committed mentally ill patients. Id. at 303-04. This suggestion
resulted from reliance on Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982), which was
decided in the same term. The Supreme Court later remanded the same issue involving
the forcible medication of involuntarily committed mentally ill patients, stating that the
issue be decided in light of Youngberg. See Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983)
(en bane) (on remand from Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982)). The Third Circuit
held that the decision to medicate only after the patient is found to endanger himself or
others is a medical one and does not violate due process.
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then the Court was unjustified in conflating the two asserted state
interests into one another.
Regardless of whether a legitimate state interest in providing
medical treatment existed, had the Court separated the analysis of
the two distinct state interests, as it did in Turner,13 7 the regulation
would have been invalid.138 The drugs administered to Harper have
been shown to alleviate many of the symptoms that manifest them-
selves as dangerous activity and have undisputed therapeutic bene-
fits, but it was obvious that Harper did not think the drug treatment
was in his best interest.13 9 At least one court has suggested that the
prison's obligation to provide medication when the inmate refuses is
not a legitimate state interest:1 40
True, the jail is under a constitutional duty to treat the medical needs
of pretrial detainees.., and such treatment includes mental as well as
physical disorders .... The premise underlying this duty is that the
state may not deliberately fail to provide necessary medical treatment
when it is desired by the detainee. Medical treatment is designed to ensure
that the conditions of pretrial detention do not amount to the imposi-
tion of punishment.... This constitutional requirement cannot be
turned on its head to mean that if a competent individual chooses not
to undertake the risks or pains of a potentially dangerous treatment,
the jail may force him to accept it. Absent legitimate government
objectives . . . we believe that involuntary medication may itself
amount to unconstitutional punishment.141
The entire Harper Court found that security concerns for the
inmates, others and property, constituted legitimate state interests.
If drug treatment decreases the danger that the inmate poses, as a
matter ofjudgment, one could draw the conclusion that forced drug
treatment is related rationally to the desired goal of security. As a
137 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987).
138 Justice Stevens found, when applying the Turner test to the state's security interest,
that the policy failed as an "overexaggerated response." Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1050 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). The basis for this conclusion was that another SOC Policy permit-
ting involuntary medication on an emergency basis was triggered by an imminent
danger of injury. In contrast, Policy 600.30 was triggered by illness-induced injury or
property damage, evidenced by past behavior, and allowed for prolonged periods of
medication. Involuntary medication, then, was the response to two distinct penological
concerns, according to justice Stevens. Justice Stevens failed to explain why responding
to both concerns by medicating involuntarily was so outlandish, especially considering
that a hearing was involved in the case of prolonged medication and probably not in the
case of an emergency. To buttress the conclusion that Policy 600.30 failed the Turner
test, Justice Stevens pointed to ready alternatives. Id. at 1051 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
He suggested segregation, standard disciplinary sanctions, and treatment with other
drugs, such as tranquilizers. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139 Id. 1046 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140 Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
141 Id. at 1395 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original).
972 [V'ol. 81
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
matter ofjudgment, though, given the intrusive nature of the drugs,
forced treatment should be viewed as an exaggerated response. Jus-
tice Stevens' argument that involuntary drug treatment responds to
more than one penological concern is not novel.142
Justice Stevens likely is objecting to the Turner test itself, which
he originally rejected in his Turner dissent.' 43 In Turner, he joined
the Court's opinion regarding invalidation of the prison's marriage
regulation, which was viewed as an exaggerated response to institu-
tional concerns. 44 Justice Stevens seemed anxious in Harper to use
the "exaggerated response" rationale to validate the reasonable re-
lation test as a means of protecting the individual's interests.
Whether we separate the state's interests or not, one can argue that
the regulation could be seen as an exaggerated response to the
state's legitimate institutional concerns.
Whether or not the Justices viewed the regulation as an exag-
gerated response reflects their definitions of the liberty interest.
The dissent's charge that the majority failed to put each interest
separately through the reasonable relation test may be correct, but
the Court ultimately would have upheld the regulation as valid. The
Turner Court invalidated the marriage regulation after it determined
that the right to marry was no less fundamental 45 for the prison
inmate than it was for the civilian. 146 The majority in Harper would
not recognize the inmate's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs as
fundamental, but rather insisted on considering the liberty interest
142 See id. at 1395-96. "Absent an emergency... we do not believe forcible medica-
tion with antipsychotic drugs is 'reasonably related' to the concededly legitimate goals of
jail safety and security."
143 Turner, 482 U.S. 78, 100-16 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
But if the standard can be satisfied by nothing more than a 'logical connection' be-
tween the regulation and any legitimate penological concern perceived by a cau-
tious warden [majority opinion at 94 (emphasis in the original)], it is virtually
meaningless. Application of the standard would seem to permit disregard for in-
mates' constitutional rights whenever the imagination of the warden produces a
plausible security concern and a deferential trial court is able to discern a logical
connection between that concern and the challenged regulation.
Id. at 100-01.
144 The Court first suggested the notion of an exaggerated response in Pell v.
Procunier, stating that prohibition of face-to-face media interviews was not an exagger-
ated response to security consideration. 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974). The Turner Court
adopted this notion as a means to invalidate the marriage regulation in question. The
state asserted two particular objectives tojustify the regulation, a security interest and a
rehabilitative interest. The Court held that the regulation was an exaggerated response
to security concerns, because it failed to meet the relevant factors outlined. Turner, 482
U.S. at 97-99.
145 The decision to marry is a fundamental right. Zablocid v.. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1976); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
146 Turner, 482 U.S. at 96.
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only within the context of the inmate's confinement. The Turner
Court also looked at the right to marry in the context of confine-
ment, but was unwilling to allow confinement to alter the fundamen-
tal nature of the liberty interest.1 47 Therefore, Justice Kennedy's
suggestion that confinement necessarily alters the nature of the lib-
erty interest 148 was unfounded. It appears that the Court's defini-
tion of the liberty interest influenced the standard of review analysis.
What is even more significant is that in applying the reasonable
relation test, the Court did not consider the individual's interest,
except in terms of what "costs" the state would suffer in allowing
the individual to exercise the right. The reasonable relation test is
not a balancing test.
It is arguable that the regulation could have failed the reason-
able relation test, because ready alternatives to drug treatment satis-
fying each separate interest existed. With regard to the security
interest, there are obvious alternatives for dealing with an inmate's
danger to himself and others that are used all the time by prisons.
In fact, Justice Stevens suggested several of these alternatives in his
dissent-restraints, confinement, and other drugs such as tranquiliz-
ers. The state and its amici argued, however, that these were not
viable alternatives.1 49 Under Turner, the state needs only to show
that the ready alternatives do not "fully accommodat[e] the pris-
oner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests." 150
This also is not a least restrictive means test; the state need not pres-
ent all alternatives and reject each one. Justice Kennedy concluded
that the state satisfied this burden.
With regard to the medical interests of the inmate, the record
indicated that Harper's antipsychotic drug treatment was of mixed
therapeutic value and was used almost principally to deal with po-
tential violent behavior. The question of whether there existed
other means to treat Harper's mental illness thus remained open.
Given, however, that the Court could not separate medical from in-
stitutional concerns, involuntary antipsychotic drug treatment, ac-
cording to the Court, was the only method for achieving both
ends.15 1
147 "These incidents of marriage, like the religious and personal aspects of the mar-
riage commitment, are unaffected by the fact of confinement or the pursuit of legitimate
corrections goals." Id. at 95.
148 Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1990).
149 Id. at 1039 & n.10.
150 Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
151 Justice Kennedy's inability to separate the state's interest in providing medical
care to the inmate from the state's interest in institutional concerns may be more signifi-
cant thanJustice Stevens at first realized. In a case before the Court this term, the State
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B. THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION
Once it is determined that there is a protected constitutional
right that may be overridden by the state's interest under certain
circumstances, courts face the final frontier of a due process ques-
tion-what procedural protections are necessary to safeguard
against arbitrary or erroneous decisions to medicate against an in-
mate's will. The SOC Policy provided for a hearing before a three-
person fact-finding panel. The Washington State Supreme Court
held that this was insufficient to protect the inmate's fundamental
liberty interest and that a full judicial hearing was required. Justice
Stevens, in his dissent, agreed; Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, however, found the policy's procedural protections
satisfactory.' 52
Justice Kennedy commented that the major point of disagree-
ment between the opinions was whether a judicial decision-maker
was required. A comparison of his opinion with that of Justice Ste-
vens' indicates that the Justices largely disagreed over whether the
hearing fact-finders were impartial. 153
The SOC Policy required that the hearing committee be com-
of Louisiana sought to give forcibly to a prisoner on death row antipsychotic drugs
solely in an attempt to make him mentally competent to be executed. (It is cruel and
unusual punishment to execute insane prisoners. Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986).) The trial court ordered the medication. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
after it decided Harper. Perry v. Louisiana, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990). The Court heard
oral arguments on October 2, 1990. Louisiana v. Perry, 59 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Oct. 23,
1990) (No. 89-5120). The Court then vacated the trial court's decision and remanded
the case "for further consideration in light of Washington v. Harper." 59 U.S.L.W. 4007
(U.S. Nov. 13, 1990) (No. 89-5120).
152 For the past fifteen years, the question of what process is due has been guided by
the factors set out in Mathews v. Eldridge:
the specific dictates of due process generally require consideration of three distinct
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ment would entail.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
While commentators have criticized these factors, see, e.g., J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of Value, 44 U. CHI.
L. REV. 28 (1976), both the majority and dissent seem satisfied with their application.
153 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1052 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens would
have upheld the Washington Supreme Court's decision to require ajudicial hearing, but
suggested that "a review procedure administered by impartial, nonjudicial professionals
might avoid the constitutional deficiency in Policy 600.30." Id. at 1055 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). The requirement of an impartial decision-maker was not contested and was
required under Vitek. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980).
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posed of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and the Center's Associate Su-
perintendent. Furthermore, none of the committee members could
be involved in the inmate's treatment or diagnosis at the time of the
hearing.154 The decision was subject to the Superintendent's re-
view, and the inmate was entitled to judicial review. 155 Justice Ken-
nedy stated, "In the absence of record evidence to the contrary, we
are not willing to presume that members of the staff lack the neces-
sary independence to provide an inmate with a full and fair hearing
in accordance with the policy."'1 56
Justice Stevens argued, however, that the decision-makers had
"two disqualifying conflicts of interest." 157 First, colleagues of the
treating physician comprised the panel and therefore reviewed each
others' decisions. 158 Second, the panel members, as Center staff
members, were concerned not only with the inmate's medical inter-
ests but also with controlling the inmate. 159 In particular, Justice
Stevens questioned whether the panel members were qualified to
make medical decisions, 160 if, in fact, that is what they were do-
ing.' 6 ' Justice Stevens concluded that a judicial hearing was the
only viable alternative capable of ensuring an impartial decision. 162
There is support for each of the Justices' points of view. Some
states, such as Massachusetts, require ajudicial model for determin-
ing if a patient can be medicated against his will.163 Justice Kennedy
154 This only applied to the initial seven day period and not to the decisions to extend
the period of medication. In fact, Dr. Petrich, Harper's attending physician, served on
the committee approving long-term medication. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1053 & n.23 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
155 Judicial review was only available in the form of a personal restraint petition or a
petition for an extraordinary writ. Id. at 1034.
156 Id. at 1043.
157 Id. at 1052 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Stevens, J, dissenting).
159 Id. at 1053 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
160 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Two of the committee members were not licensed to
prescribe medication, and one of those had no medical expertise.
161 There is a suggestion in the record that the medication prescribed to sedate
Harper was used prophylactically and may have exacerbated his psychosis. Id. at 1054,
1050 n.16, & 1051 n.17. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 1055 (Stevens,J, dissenting). Justice Kennedy cited Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 607 (1977) for the contention that the due process clause has never been thought
to require ajudicial hearing. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042. Justice Stevens did not indicate
that judicial hearings are required, but they would be the best means for achieving im-
partial decision making. Id. at 1055 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163 See Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d
645 (1983). In Rogers, the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court held that involuntarily
committed mental patients may refuse antipsychotic drug treatment. This right of re-
fusal existed until a judge declared the patient incompetent, at which point the judge
must substitute his or her judgment for that of the patient. The Third Circuit rejected
this two-tiered judicial approach in Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1983), and the
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referred to literature which indicated that outside decision-makers,
including judges, concur with the treating physician's decision. 164
Justice Stevens' claims may be valid, but if there is any validity to the
assertion that outside decision-makers tend to rubber stamp the
treating physician's recommendation, then there can be little sup-
port for the dissent's conclusion, especially if it results in financial
and expedience costs. If Harper had a fundamental right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs and the state had a legitimate interest in medi-
cating him, then protecting Harper's right would have required in-
dependent, unbiased decision-makers, which he may not have, in
fact, had. While a court may give great deference to a medical pro-
fessional's recommendation, it also would give the individual whose
right is jeopardized the right to counsel, the protection of the rules
of evidence, and the appellate process-in other words, more op-
portunity to protect his or her fundamental liberty interest.
C. THE COMPETENCY FACTOR
In a very short, but pithy concurrence Justice Blackmun wrote,
[m]uch of the difficulty will be lessened if, in any appropriate case, the
mentally ill patient is formally committed. This on occasion may seem
to be a bother or a nuisance, but it is a move that would be protective
for all concerned, the inmate, the institution, its staff, the physician,
and the State itself.165
Harper did not plead insanity as a defense. The state neither
judged him incompetent to stand trial nor formally committed him
to a mental hospital.' 66 Harper suffered from a mental illness,' 67
and the state transferred him to the SOC for treatment' 68 so that he
could be returned to a regular correctional institution to serve the
remainder of his sentence. 169 While at the SOC he initially submit-
ted to antipsychotic drug treatment.'7 0 He subsequently refused the
Supreme Court suggested that the Massachusetts scheme exceeds the protections re-
quired by the due process clause. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
164 See Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1043 n.13 (citing Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment
with Antipsychotic Medications: Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 413, 417-18
(1988); Bloom, Faulkner, Holm, & Rawlinson, An Empirical View of Patients Exercising Their
Right to Refuse Treatment, 7 INrT'LJ. L. & PsYcHIATRY 315, 325 (1984); Hickman, Resnick,
& Olson, Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: An Interdisciplinary Proposal, 6 MENTAL Dis-
A.iLrry L. REP. 122, 130 (1982)).
165 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1044-45 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
166 Id. at 1032.






As competent civilians, we have the right to accept or refuse
medication.1 72 In certain instances, due to mental illness, individu-
als are considered either as a danger to themselves or others, or as
unable to decide what is in their best interests. In those instances,
the state will seek to have the person committed. Because the state
exerts control over the individual, attendant procedural safeguards
are required. 173 The basic liberty interest of freedom from restraint
is being denied. The state has taken responsibility for the individual
at that point. It decides what is in the best interests of the individual
through its parens patriae authority, 174 for incompetency does not ob-
literate an individual's liberty interest.1 75 The exercise of parens pa-
triae authority to force psychiatric treatment is premised on the need
to help individuals who are incapable of making their own treatment
decisions.176
Although the Court has declined the opportunity to decide
whether or not an involuntarily committed mental patient is entitled
to a judicial hearing before being forcibly medicated with antip-
sychotic drugs, the Court did suggest that it was not required under
the due process clause. 177 The rationale for the Court's suggestion
is conceivably that the state, through judicial procedures, has deter-
mined that the individual is incapable of deciding what is in his or
her best interests. This includes the inability to determine what
medical treatment would be best.
171 Id.
172 An individual's decision to accept or forego medical treatment is not wholly a
medical decision, but is directed by one's personal values. This idea forms the founda-
tion of informed consent.
The very foundation of the doctrine of [informed consent] is every man's right to
forego treatment or even cure if it entails whatfor him are intolerable consequences
or risks, however warped or perverted his sense of values may be in the eyes of the
medical profession, or even of the community, so long as any distortion falls short
of what the law regards as incompetency. Individual freedom here is guaranteed
only if people are given the right to make choices which would generally be re-
garded as foolish.
Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 931-32 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES,JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 61 (1968 Supp.)) (emphasis in treatise). See also Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2041, 2046-47 (1990).
173 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979). Clear and convincing evidence
for incompetency is required in involuntary commitment hearings, because the interest
of the individual far outweighs that of a state, which has no legitimate interest in confin-
ing individuals who are not mentally ill and do not pose a danger to themselves or
others.
174 Parenspatriae, literally "parent of the country," refers to the state's role as guardian
of a person with legal disability.
175 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
176 Addington, 444 U.S. at 426.
177 Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 304 (1982).
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When there are no formal commitment procedures, the pris-
oner faced with forcible drug treatment has not been afforded a ju-
dicial determination that he or she is considered incapable of
making such a determination.
The State of Washington has provided that involuntarily com-
mitted mental patients may refuse antipsychotic drug treatment. In-
voluntary treatment may only be administered by court order,
except in the case of an emergency.1 78 Washington thus recognizes
that an involuntarily committed individual, who receives the full
panoply of procedural safeguards in commitment proceedings,1 79
has a fundamental liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs.
By virtue of the fact that Walter Harper is behind bars, however, he
does not.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Kennedy's legal analysis of a prison inmate's right to re-
fuse antipsychotic medication was sound. Definition of a liberty in-
terest is a judgment left to the discretion of the Court and defining
the interest within the context of the inmate's confinement was not
contrary to precedent. In addition the state has a legitimate interest
in institutional concerns which entails providing medical treatment;
drug treatment is related reasonably to this legitimate state interest.
Ready and efficient alternatives are not available. While profession-
als outside the prison facility would be more likely to be unbiased
decision-makers, this alternative would be costly. As determined by
the'Harper Court, Washington State's SOC Policy 600.30 does pro-
vide procedural safeguards in accordance with the due process
requirements.
Given the highly intrusive nature of antipsychotic drugs, Justice
Stevens' conclusion that refusal of antipsychotic drug treatment is a
fundamental liberty interest is more convincing. Given the law re-
garding prison regulations, the only means of invalidating the chal-
lenged policy was to conclude that no actual medical determination
was required and that the regulation was an exaggerated response
to security concerns. That the state could overcome an individual's
right to refuse or accept medication without the highest level of pro-
tection seems aberrational in light of the common law tradition of
informed consent. A judicial determination that the individual is in-
capable of determining for himself or herself what is or is not in his
or her best medical interests should be afforded any person, crimi-
178 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.370 (Supp. 1990).
179 Id. § 71.05.150.
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nal or not, before forced medication is administered. Where possi-
ble, formal commitment proceedings for mentally ill inmates should
be conducted.
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